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Abstract 
This paper explores how political developments in a host country catalyse the awakening of a 
latent diaspora and lead to the activation of a transnational community that previously consisted 
of loose and scattered networks. It also draws attention to the generational continuation of 
identity politics in a diaspora context through analysing a second generation’s abrupt interest in 
homeland politics. By using the Turkish community in Sweden as a case study and by basing its 
main arguments on extensive research and fieldwork, it suggests that inter-diaspora rivalries and 
group competition may help to gain a better understanding of the interest that diasporans show in 
the promotion of homeland politics. It also suggests that although the diasporic discourses are 
based on contested political issues in their home country, the framing process takes place with 
regards to the host country context. The paper suggests that there were two significant 
transformative and triggering factors in Sweden that motivated the Turkish diaspora to actively 
participate in efforts to affect policy-making mechanisms in Sweden: Kurdish diaspora activism in 
general and the passage of the Armenian Genocide Bill by the Swedish Parliament on the 11th of 
March, 2010.  
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Introduction 
“We had to respond to the Kurds in some way”, responded one of the Turkish interviewees when I 
asked the reason behind his interest in Turkish politics, “they are ruining our [Turkish] image here 
in Sweden.” He was a young Swedish citizen of Turkish origin who was born in the suburbs of 
Stockholm. He had recently been active in one of the main Turkish organisations and was 
dynamically participating in discussions on blogs and in chat rooms that were formed to raise 
awareness against the passage of the Armenian Genocide Bill on 11 March 2010 at the Swedish 
Parliament. He was also among the participants at the rally, which for the first time gathered 
approximately three thousand members of the Turkish community in the main square in 
Stockholm to protest in the name of their homeland.1 According to him, the image of the Turks in 
Sweden was “damaged” because of the “Kurdish diaspora lobby against Turkey” and the passage 
of the Genocide Bill, which “passed due to this lobby”, could be interpreted as the “last straw.”  In 
his words, it was an “eye-opener” for the Turkish community to become part of a counter-political 
mobilisation process and “act as a diaspora.” He stated, “We have to do something as we are 
already too late.” 
 
This testimony above was surely not exceptional; on the contrary, this interviewee was one of 
many second generation Turks who started to show a sudden interest in homeland politics and 
                                                
1“Isvec’teki Turkler Soykirim Yasasini Protesto Etti”, Hurriyet, 11 March 2010. (Last accessed 23 January 
2013). (http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/dunya/14180087.asp?gid=200) 
became engaged in political mobilisation efforts in order to affect policy-making mechanisms in 
Sweden. Since the Swedish Parliament approved a resolution recognising the mass killing of 
Armenians under the rule of the Ottoman Empire in 1915 as genocide, there has been a visible 
increment in Turkish political activism in Sweden. This is a highly contested issue in both Turkey 
and in the international arena due to the Turkish state’s denial to define the atrocities (forced 
deportations, massacres and disappearances) of 1915 as genocide. This has caused significant 
nationalistic reactions in Turkey and among Turkish migrant populations in Europe.  
 
Countries such as France, Greece and Belgium have already recognised the atrocities of 1915 as 
genocide. In Sweden the bill won the support of five of the seven Swedish parliamentary parties, 
which mainly represented the left side of the political spectrum and was passed after highly 
contentious debates among parliamentarians before and after the 11th of March.2 The fact that the 
passage of the bill was supported by various Kurdish organisations as well as Kurdish origin 
members of parliament caused dismay and enhanced the widespread Turkish bitterness towards 
Kurdish activism in Sweden in general. Some members of the Turkish community in Sweden 
responded to the decision with a strong sense of frustration, for instance, some Turkish members 
of the Social Democrat Party, which voted in favor of the passage of the Genocide Bill, resigned 
en masse in Gothenburg to protest their parties’ approach to this sensitive issue.3 What was 
interesting about these developments was that, strikingly, the second generation’s reaction was 
evidently stronger than the reaction of the first generation.  
 
According to Adamson, “the first step in the creation of a diasporic community is the activation of 
a transnational constituency from the mass of entangled and messy social networks” (Adamson 
2012: 33). At this point, diaspora elites play a big role and channel these scattered small group 
efforts into one collective narrative. The aim is to create “coherent categories, discourses and 
symbols that can merge dispersed social networks under a single diasporic category” (Adamson 
2012: 33). The push for the creation of a diasporic community usually comes from a critical 
juncture that occurs in the home country but as will be argued in this paper, sometimes the 
circumstances in the host country may also catalyse this activation process. Over recent years, 
despite their intra-group ideological differences, the Turkish transnational community has been 
slowly but surely forming a diasporic structure that could act as the “Turkish Voice” by bringing 
together the sporadic and weak networks of various ideological clusters and collecting them under 
an alliance that aims at “protecting the reputation of Turkey in the eyes of the Swedish public.”4  
 
Members of the Turkish community who belong to opposite camps in Turkish politics come 
together to demonstrate against the decision of the Swedish Parliament and form a diasporic space 
which channels the grievances of the Turkish community into a collective narrative. The reason 
behind this effort was the accumulated resentment of the Turkish community against Kurdish 
activism in Sweden, as well as Sweden’s welcoming approach towards non-militant Kurdish 
activism on its soil (Baser 2012). The second generation is particularly active in this newly 
emerging mobilisation.  This is largely due to the political developments in the host country and 
because they perceive Sweden’s approach to Turkey’s political matters to be a threat to their own 
image and status as a minority group in Sweden. Contingent alliances are made between other 
groups who are considered as “co-ethnics” or “ethnic cousins” such as the Azerbaijanis and the 
Uyghurs and diasporic battle fronts are being formed which reflect the enmities back in Turkey. 
                                                
2“Sweden to Recognize the Armenian Genocide”, The Local, 11 March 2010. (Last accessed 23 January 2013). 
(http://www.thelocal.se/25468/20100311/) 
3 “Isvec’teki Turkler Soykirim Yasasini Protesto Etti”, Hurriyet, 11 March 2010. (Last accessed 23 January 
2013). (http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/dunya/14180087.asp?gid=200) 
4 Interview with the former president of the Turkish Youth Association (TUF), June 2010.  
What we can see today is that from a transnational community that had predominantly economic 
and cultural ties with the homeland, a diaspora with solid political projects is being born.  
 
In this case at hand, the political developments in Sweden have triggered an urge to form a 
coherent stance, but coincidentally enough, this diasporic awakening coincides with the 
homeland’s new trajectory of strengthening the Turkish diaspora and its co-ethnics abroad. For the 
last couple of years, the Turkish state, which used to perceive Turkish migrants abroad as 
“remittance machines” (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003) rather than robust political agents representing 
Turkey abroad, started formulating strategies to effectively utilise Turkish migrants’ transnational 
potential for its own benefits (Baser 2013). This neo-liberal approach required more contact with 
the Turkish communities abroad and a specific unit was formed by the Turkish state called the 
Presidency for Turks Abroad and Kin Communities. Yet, the phenomenon of a diaspora’s political 
activism is far more complicated than a simple response to “homeland calling” (Demmers 2007: 
14). One can observe that the interactions between the Turkish diaspora actors have been 
enhanced over the past few years, but it does not mean that this newly established link between 
the homeland and the diaspora elites can become an alternative explanation for the diasporic 
awakening of the Turkish community in Sweden. The centre of gravity of motivations and 
initiatives for mobilisation still came from the Turkish community in Sweden itself and the new 
diaspora strategy of the Turkish state officials could only play a complementary role rather than 
constituting the fundamental explanation behind these recent developments.  
 
The current paper seeks to provide a deeper understanding of these newly embraced political 
mobilisation efforts of the Turkish transnational community in Sweden. The main questions asked 
here can be listed as the following: What triggers an interest in diaspora mobilisation in the 
hostland? Why and how do the second generation employ “transnational identity politics as a 
policy tool” (Shain & Barth 2003)? First, the paper addresses how political developments in a host 
country affect a transnational migrant community, which can lead to the formation of a diaspora 
that actively mobilises for policy change in the host country. Second, it explores the generational 
continuation in a diaspora context through a second generation’s interest in mobilising for 
homeland politics. It argues that although the diasporic discourses of the Turkish community are 
based on contested political issues in their home country, the frames they use for their discourses 
are related to the host country’s context and the awakening process occurs due to the political state 
of affairs in Sweden. The aim is not to profoundly analyse the long-standing issues revolving 
around the Turkish-Kurdish Question or the recognition of the Armenian Genocide, but instead to 
use these empirical findings to better understand the mobilisation processes of diasporas, the 
generational-continuation of diasporic activism and the intra-group rivalries and contingent 
alliances among diaspora groups in a given hostland.  
 
The focus on the Turkish diaspora activism is important in the sense that there is insufficient 
academic work on the Turkish community and its engagement with Turkish politics so far, apart 
from that of a few authors who worked on the media practices (Altug 2006) and organisational 
behaviour (Akis & Kalaylioglu 2010) of the Turkish migrants in Stockholm. Other Turkish 
migrant groups in Germany or the Netherlands have been largely investigated but the Turks in 
Sweden remain an unexplored topic for researchers. Analysing the Swedish case shows that home 
states unevenly distribute their attention to their constituencies abroad and the diasporisation 
process of an ethnic community occurs asynchronously in each hostland context depending on 
various factors, such as the existence of diaspora elites, the composition of migrants, the 
hostland’s political environment as well as the home state’s reach to those communities.  
 
Theoretical Approaches to Diaspora and Mobilisation for Homeland Politics 
Over the last few decades, diasporas have become one of the most popular subjects among 
scholars and there is a growing literature analysing the role of diaspora groups as non-state actors. 
Broadly defined as migrant communities dispersed outside a homeland’s borders, which keep 
certain social, economic and political attachments to the homeland and mobilise under a collective 
identity which is either ideological, ethnic or religious: diaspora groups all around the world are 
attracting the attention of numerous scholars, specialists, journalists and policy-makers. Many 
authors argue that the opportunities facilitated by globalisation enable diasporas to directly 
influence their homelands, as well as to lobby the host country governments for their homeland’s 
benefit (Shain & Barth 2003, Østergaard-Nielsen 2003, Lyons & Mandaville 2010a, Adamson 
2012) and they try to further understand the galvanising factors behind their mobilisation.  
 
Existing studies usually focus on the experience of the first generation and their attachments to 
their homeland to explain the causes of diaspora mobilisation for a collective aim. From this 
perspective, a diaspora’s connection to their homeland is their principle motivation for political 
action, both in their hostland and transnationally. Diaspora mobilisation practices such as voting 
abroad, sending remittances or promoting homeland politics (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003, Nell 2008) 
are cited as examples to demonstrate its importance. Surely, diaspora-homeland relations are an 
incontestable part of the diaspora mobilisation process; however, the promotion of homeland 
related issues does not solely explain why interest in diaspora formation within a transnational 
community is triggered. Some authors also point to the hostland context to analyse the impact of 
the hostland’s political environment on the evolution of diasporic identities. Many authors argue 
that the scope of the political transnationalism practiced by diaspora groups depends on the 
transnational opportunity structures (Ögelman et al. 2002, Koopmans and Statham 2001, Nell 
2008). An abundance of research is available on the experiences of exclusion, segregation, limited 
economic, political and social opportunities as well as how they strengthen a transnational migrant 
community’s retention of their ethnic ties. The emphasis on the host country’s context usually 
revolves around integration issues, which are useful but limited in explaining diasporic identity 
formation. Diaspora mobilisation and their related political aims are more complex than they 
appear and are affected by a combination of exogenous and endogenous factors that need further 
attention by scholars. More precisely, “diasporans’ intervention in matters concerning the 
homeland depends on interests and obligations rooted in the host society as well as the homeland” 
(Brinkerhoff 2009: 7). While having strong ties to their homeland is one of the main components 
in the definition of a diaspora, it does not mean that diasporas are neutral to the political 
developments in their hostland.  
 
Research in diaspora studies often emphasises a specific framework in homeland-diaspora 
relations that depicts diasporas as groups dedicating their time and energy solely to benefit the 
homeland, undermining the fact that the promotion of the homeland’s interests sometimes 
coincides with the interests of the diaspora groups. This approach, which perceives the diaspora as 
an altruistic entity, is highly prominent in current studies. For example, the work of Saideman et 
al. (2011: 6-13) summarises the current perspectives on the motivational and capacity theories of 
mobilisation and finds in both theories that the homeland is central and diasporas are perceived as 
romantic pursuers of long-distance nationalism, or tools of their home states. They are accepted as 
individual actors in some cases, but use this energy on homeland interests, assuming they have no 
interests of their own. For example, how diasporas form a counter–stance against other rival 
groups within a given context is largely neglected in the literature. By criticising this approach, 
Saideman et al. argue that diasporas may function in a similar way as interest groups, such as 
making a material and non-material “cost-benefit mobilizational calculus” before they act on a 
certain issue. In other words, the idea behind diaspora mobilisation cannot solely be explained by 
“emotional fulfilment” (Sheffer 2003). Kenny further suggests, “support for diasporan nationalism 
is strategically adopted by particular groups within the immigrant community as a means of 
generating support for their own local goals in the host society.” He argues that once these elite 
groups are absent, it is hard to find support for homeland related political issues and/or 
mobilisation levels are much lower (Kenny 1998:1). In parallel to these arguments, this paper 
contends that it should not be taken for granted that diasporas prioritise their homeland’s agenda 
first and a diaspora’s own interests and its status within the host country are also to be considered 
part of the puzzle.  
 
Understanding the Peculiarities of Diaspora Mobilisation 
Some argue that the emergence of diaspora groups can be explained by an essentialist point of 
view, as a natural and automatic result of migration, exile or dispersion. However, this 
perspective ignores the mobilisation factor in the diasporisation process and runs the “risk of 
moving towards essentialising diaspora as an ethnic label rather than a framework of analysis” 
(Butler 2001). This paper, in accordance with Fiona Adamson (2008:7), builds on the 
constructivist approach, which perceives diasporic identity as a social construction of 
transnational networks and identities. Not all the members of an ethnic and religious 
community in a hostland constitute a diaspora. Diasporic identity is formed as a result of a 
combination of experiences both in the homeland and hostland. Based on this approach, 
diaspora is not simply a dispersed ethnic group but rather an identity constructed by the 
mobilisation efforts of certain elites in the hostland context. Political engagement also 
constitutes one of the central characteristics of a diaspora group. As Lyons and Mandaville 
(2010b: 126) argue, diasporas are not “given, pre-existing social actors” but instead they are 
“generated by politics”. Not every migrant who retains a sense-of-belonging to the homeland is 
a member of the diaspora, therefore “diasporas include only those who are mobilised to engage 
in homeland political processes.”  
 
Based on the argument that diasporas are not a natural outcome of migration but are political 
entities, one should ask the question: “Why does a diaspora discourse arise among a certain 
group of people?” (Sökefeld 2006). Many explain the motivations for diaspora mobilisation by 
referencing an experience of traumatic dispersal or exile (Jewish and Armenian examples are 
the most common). However, this definition excludes many other migrant groups which act as 
a diaspora or define themselves as such. How, then, can we explain the diasporic mobilisation 
of the transnational migrant communities who migrated for purely economic reasons? 
According to Kenny, “In most cases support for homeland nationalism may be a social norm, 
but it requires at most no-cost lip service support. Successful nationalist mobilisation entails 
arriving at a situation in which the issue of the homeland is seen by at least some immigrants as 
a high priority issue requiring high-cost active support” (Kenny 1998: 1). What then causes this 
behavioral shift? Safran (2007) argues that, “diaspora consciousness may be revived after a 
special event, such as a revolutionary struggle or a tragic experience that brings back the 
importance of the kinship connection”. Demmers (2007:8) adds to the discussion the 
phenomenon of a “diasporic turn,” which transnational community members might experience 
after specific events that trigger diaspora identification. These kinds of arguments help us to 
understand why a transnational community might over time give birth to a diasporic segment. 
However, there is a tendency to assume that this shift followed by diaspora formation will 
occur due to critical developments or changes only in the homeland. Several examples exist 
along these lines, such as the Croatian Diaspora’s reaction to the disintegration of Yugoslavia 
or the support of Kosovo Albanians from former Yugoslavia in the struggle for Greater 
Albania (Faist 2004: 349).  
 
This paper argues that diaspora mobilisation can also occur as a result of certain political 
developments in the hostland, such as changes in the bilateral relations between the homeland and 
hostland political actors or a sudden divergence in a hostland’s foreign policy priorities towards 
the homeland. These events can induce significant changes in how a transnational community 
shapes its political stance towards homeland politics within the political and social contexts of a 
hostland. They can pave the way for a loosely bonded transnational community to combine 
scattered actions into a unified and solid act. In some cases, diaspora groups may feel that their 
status as an ethnic minority in the host society is threatened and then, seek assistance from 
homeland actors in reaction to these changes. As Kenny suggests, members of a transnational 
community may mobilise for homeland related issues, not through failing to integrate into the host 
society or because they have emotional attachments to their ancestral land but because promoting 
homeland interests will also advance their position in the host country (Kenny 1998: 3). Their 
motivations may arise from “social reinforcement or pride” (Brinkerhoff 2008: 243) or their 
material and non-material interests as a collective group within the hostland. Diaspora 
mobilisation should not be solely associated with the “homeland calling.” In today’s world the 
reverse is possible; diasporisation of a transnational community may cause a “diaspora calling” 
situation. For example, the diaspora elites could actively seek synchronisation on particular issues 
with the homeland discourses, policies and politics in order to have more say in their hostland 
political spheres.   
 
Homeland nostalgia is not the sole catalyst for transnational communities to mobilise as diaspora 
groups. Interest-based politics and rational anticipation could also explain why certain groups 
transform into collectively-organised, politically-active networks. Especially when there is 
competition between several ethnic groups in the homeland, cost-benefit calculations and 
concerns about their status in the hostland become much more prominent for the diaspora elites. 
Political or social tensions in the homeland can be imported to the host country’s context and from 
time to time surface rivalries among groups within the hostland may arise. Achieving a certain 
position in the eyes of the host society may trigger competition and tension between two 
adversary diaspora groups. If one group enjoys less media attention or believes its discursive 
opportunities are more limited due to the host country’s support of the other group(s), then it 
could be motivated to take action. In the case of state-linked diaspora groups, the elites may seek 
assistance from homeland actors to better influence hostland politics. They may also synchronise 
their own narratives with the pre-existing homeland discourses on a certain issue. For these 
groups, building an alliance with the homeland is not a precondition for mobilisation. They may 
act on their own, with or without seeking the material and non-material support of their homeland, 
on issues relating to homeland politics. In these cases, contingent alliances between diaspora elites 
and homeland actors are conceivable. In other cases involving stateless diasporas, the elites of 
these groups might adjust their actions according to the given situation to focus more on affecting 
policy change in the host country or in building alliances with NGOs and civil society 
organisations.  
 
Mobilisation of the Second Generation for Homeland Politics 
There is still a huge gap in terms of understanding how diasporas mobilise and how the 
generational continuation of political activism takes place. Scholars are not in agreement about 
whether the second generation has as strong transnational ties as the first generation. Authors 
such as Portes and Rumbaut (2001) argue that the second generation has fewer ties with the 
homeland and that those transnational ties are a “one-generation phenomenon.” Other authors 
argue that the second generation maintains ties with the homeland of their parents; however 
this attachment cannot solely be measured by statistics, such as remittances or frequency of 
visits to the homeland (Levitt et al. 2002). Today, more and more scholars argue that some 
second generation members maintain a sense of belonging towards their country of residence, 
despite being unable to speak the native language, having never visited that “imagined” 
homeland, and having no intention to move there.  
 
Glick-Schiller (2004: 578) argues that the offspring of migrants, even those who have obtained 
citizenship in their new country of residence, may embrace long-distance nationalism as a 
response to the racism and negative stereotyping that they encounter in the hostland. She offers 
the example of Turkish youths whose families have resided in a country for several generations 
and yet are denied full citizenship rights and, thus, need to look for a homeland trans-
nationally. However, experiences of exclusion in the host country cannot solely explain 
diasporic mobilisation among the second generation members of the community. As Perlmann 
(2002: 218-219) argues: “the answer can hardly be that the host society is uniformly hostile.” It 
is important to look at the positive incentives and opportunities that the host societies provide 
for the following generations. For instance, multicultural policies and encouraging diversity 
could be one of the main reasons that the second generation establishes symbolic ties with their 
ancestor’s homeland.  
 
Most importantly is the fact that the second generation establishes transnational networks and 
practices yet their repertoires of action are not always identical to the actions and strategies of 
the first generations. As Lyons and Mandaville (2010b: 137) state, “loyalties can remain high 
across generations whereas the most important frames shift.” The following generations have 
different attitudes towards homeland issues due to their socialisation in the host country and 
their symbolic ties to their ancestors’ homeland. Therefore, they frame their dissent or 
endorsement of particular issues differently to prior generations.  
 
Data Gathering and Fieldwork in Sweden 
The paper focuses on those Turks who have an interest in and influence upon homeland 
politics. To borrow Brubaker’s terms, only the members of the Turkish transnational 
community who take a “stance” or have a “claim” (Brubaker 2005) about the political issues in 
Turkey were included in the sample. The interviewees were active in protest events or other 
types of political demonstrations and actions, constantly followed the political developments in 
Turkey and tried to get involved in the political projects constructed by the diaspora elites. 
Rather than reifying a whole ethnic group and homogenising them to one cluster of a diaspora 
community, the diaspora is accepted as a subset of a transnational community (Baubock 2010) 
that is formed outside the borders of a defined or imagined homeland and whose members 
sustain attachments to the homeland economically, culturally and politically and as a result feel 
part of a collective movement that has solid political engagements to the homeland (Lyons & 
Mandaville 2010a). The diaspora is not taken for granted as being representative of a whole 
ethnic group but instead diaspora is perceived as a combination of various individuals and 
groups who claim to represent a certain ethnic group.  
 
While selecting the interviewees, Shain and Barth’s (2003: 452) categorisation of diaspora 
members into three groups was highly useful: 
a) “Core members are the organizing elites, intensively active in diasporic affairs and in 
a position to appeal for mobilization of the larger diaspora.  
b) Passive members are likely to be available for mobilization when the active leadership 
calls upon them.  
c) Silent members are a larger pool of people who are generally uninvolved in diasporic 
affairs but who may mobilize in times of crises.” 
 
The sample consisted of core and passive members of the Turkish diaspora in Sweden. Those 
who are assimilated into Swedish society or show no interest in homeland politics were not 
interviewed. Therefore, this paper does not represent the entire Turkish origin population in 
Sweden, but, rather, tries to present a comprehensive study about first and second generation 
Turks who have a politicised ethnic consciousness and are transnationally part of a broader 
ideological or political collective movement. The interviewees were members of the Turkish 
community who act as lobby groups, engage in political mobilisation efforts and seek to 
affect policy-making and carry their causes to the political platforms in Sweden.  
 
The findings are based on an ethnographic research study which combines methods such as 
direct and participant observation, semi-structured group and individual interviews, as well as 
casual conversations. Various webpages of diaspora organisations, documents, leaflets and 
other social media sources were also utilised to gather more information. The participants 
were reached through migrant organisations, blogs, discussion forums and protest events. 
Among the interviewees were public intellectuals, authors, politicians, bloggers, organisation 
leaders and members. For the purposes of this study, 30 Turkish participants who were born 
in Sweden (all were born after 1975) and 20 Turkish first generation participants were 
interviewed over a total period of six months between 2008 and 2011 in several cities in 
Sweden including Stockholm, Malmo, Uppsala and Gothenburg.5  
 
Turkish Transnational Community in Sweden 
Apart from a number of leftist activists that fled Turkey for political reasons in the 1970s and 80s, 
Turkish migration to Sweden was the result of labour migration in the 1960s, and these labour 
migrants came predominantly from a specific region which made them a relatively homogenous 
group compared to Turkish migrant communities in other European countries. The majority of 
these immigrants came from a small district called Kulu (Konya) and they were of peasant origin, 
with a low educational background.6 The sense of belonging and the loyalties they harbor also 
revolve around this regional identity, as family ties and regional attachments are particularly 
strong (Westin 2003: 991).  
 
Currently, the number of Turkish citizens residing in Sweden is estimated to be 100,000.7 Large 
flows of Turkish migration happened between 1966 and 1973, until Sweden closed its doors to 
labor migrants (Akin 2006: 33). The composition of migrants shifted with the arrival of asylum-
seekers (mostly Assyrians and Kurds) who came to Sweden after the 1971 military intervention in 
Turkey. Another wave of migration began after the military coup in 1980 and on this occasion the 
asylum-seekers were mostly of Kurdish origin as the on-going Kurdish conflict in Turkey between 
the Turkish state and the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) paved the way for more migration flows 
of Kurdish refugees and asylum seekers to Sweden.  
 
The composition of migrants and their profiles reflect the organisational structure of the Turkish 
groups in Sweden. Unlike other groups from Turkey such as Kurds and Assyrians which were 
politically active and mobilised in a sustained manner, the Turkish organisations have, until very 
                                                
5The interviews were conducted in Sweden as part of the author’s PhD research at the European University 
Institute in Florence, Italy, between 2008 and 2012. The article was written during her employment as a 
postdoctoral fellow, and member of the ERC Project “Diasporas and Contested Sovereignty” at the University of 
Warwick between 2012 and 2013.  
6 Kurdish groups were among the immigrants from Kulu. Today, some define themselves as Turkish and take 
part in the activities of the Turkish community, while others have rediscovered their Kurdish identity and joined 
the Kurdish political movement.  
7The Ministry of Labor and Social Security Official Website. (Last accessed 30 May 2012) 
http://www.csgb.gov.tr/csgbPortal/diyih.portal?page=yv&id=1#_ftn8 
recently, distanced themselves from political action and focused solely on migration related issues 
and the preservation of Turkish culture. The organisations serve as hometown associations, which 
enable Turkish people to gather and interact without a specific political agenda. Most of the 
associations define their agenda as more Sweden-oriented rather than Turkey-oriented.8 The main 
organisations were founded to act as a bridge between the Swedish policy makers and the rivalries 
between them are also contextual towards their situation in Sweden rather than ideological or 
religious divisions imported from Turkey (Akis & Kalaylioglu 2010). The first Turkish 
organisation, Turkiska Riksförbundet (TRF), assumed a leading role among the Turkish 
population for two decades. During the 1990s, second generation Turks who wanted to surpass the 
TRF directive and follow a more ‘integration-oriented’ and ‘Sweden-oriented’ agenda formed a 
second Turkish umbrella organization called Svensk-Turkiska Riksförbundet (STRF). This 
organisation also followed a non-partisan program and, until very recently, refrained from Turkish 
politics in order to focus on the social situation of Turkish migrants in Sweden. The STRF also 
cooperated with a youth association called Turkiska Ungdomsförbundet (TUF). Besides these 
three umbrella organisations, Turkiska Student och Akademiker Föreningen (TSAF) is another 
youth association that recently became active among university students.  
 
The vast majority of the Turkish community members were from a conservative background and 
inclined to support parties with nationalist agendas, however their party loyalties did not result in 
a mobilised network in Sweden.9 As Akis and Kalaylioglu (2010: 13) observed, “in respect of 
their political interests, Turkish associations in Sweden display a considerably different character 
in comparison to other Turkish associations in Europe” where “the associational life of Turks has 
taken shape in line with the basic political divisions and ideological fault lines of Turkish 
politics”. Instead in Sweden, “political divisions were not decisive in the development of Turkish 
associations.” These organisations support different Swedish parties and their activities vary; yet, 
when it comes to issues regarding homeland politics, they usually present a united front during 
protests and campaigns which are about ‘condemning terrorism’, ‘supporting the territorial 
integrity of Turkey’ or ‘protecting the image of Turkey in Sweden’ and they claim to represent a 
collective “Turkish Voice” in these matters.  
 
Diaspora groups are not homogenous entities, therefore surely they consist of various groups that 
pursue different agendas or have diverse interests. Turkish diaspora also suffers from intra-group 
rivalries and ideological or religious divides. During the recent Gezi protests in Turkey, it was 
evident that there are tensions within the Turkish community in terms of supporting or criticising 
the Turkish government10, yet when it comes to targeting policy change in Sweden, different 
Turkish diaspora members with diverse interests could come together. In other words, the 
divisions are not sharp enough to divide them on the matters related to the well being of the 
Turkish community in Sweden or the image of Turkey in international and Swedish platforms. 
Another reason is that there are no actively mass-mobilised political groups who can be perceived 
as the branches of political movements in Turkey. For example, movements such as the ultra-
nationalist Grey Wolves11 are large migrant networks in Germany with connections to political 
parties in Turkey. However, there are no groups (except for small associations which have no 
                                                
8 Interview with the president of the Turkish association (STRF) and with the former president of the Turkish 
Youth Association (TUF), June 2010.  
9 Interview with the president of the Turkish association (STRF), June 2010.  
10 Author’s observation of chat rooms and Turkish associations’ webpage discussions during and after the Gezi 
Events in Turkey between June and December 2013.  
11The Grey Wolves are the youth branch of an ultra-nationalist political party, MHP, in Turkey. They are 
mobilized in several European countries and are occasionally involved in fights with Turkish leftist groups, PKK 
(Kurdistan Worker’s Party) followers or neo-Nazis. 
significant mass support) that could be counted as satellite institutions of these movements in 
Sweden. The political activism of Turkish leftist groups could be sporadically observed until the 
end of the 1980s (Akis & Kalaylioglu 2010: 14, Altug 2006) but this is not the case today and they 
do not have a strong foothold in Turkey.  
 
While the Turkish community remained detached from active engagement in homeland politics 
and kept a low-profile for a couple of decades, Kurdish diaspora members were very active in 
establishing associations and speaking out about matters related to the Kurdish situation in 
Turkey. In the early 1980s, an umbrella organisation for all Kurdish organisations was formed 
and officially recognised by the Swedish government. Sweden has been very supportive 
towards the cultivation of the Kurdish identity by supporting civil society organisations and 
other similar migrant associations. Sweden tends to host a comparatively well-educated 
Kurdish intelligentsia consisting of journalists, authors, academics, artists and directors. It 
became a safe haven for Kurds who fled oppression in Turkey. This gave them the opportunity 
to cultivate their culture through the preservation of their traditions and the survival of their 
mother tongue, which was potentially endangered in Turkey. Van Bruinessen (1999:10) 
emphasises that Kurdish writers found Sweden “a much more stimulating environment for 
developing Kurdish into a modern literary language than they would have found back in 
Turkey, even if the language had not been banned there.” The Swedish government has also 
financed the publication of books in Kurdish and, in the early 1980s; it was the only country 
that offered such opportunities for the Kurdish cause. The Kurdish elite lobbied Swedish 
political parties on the issues related to the Kurds in Turkey and the Middle East. Kurdish 
diaspora is highly visible in the Swedish media and there are a significant number of Kurdish 
origin politicians in Sweden who carry the Kurdish issue to Swedish political platforms (Baser 
2012). 
 
Kurdish activism in Sweden greatly agitated some members of the Turkish community, leading to 
reactionary responses through time.12 Although no violence was recorded between the two 
communities, such as the street fights that occurred between Turkish and Kurdish nationalist 
groups in Germany (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003), there was apparent tension and growing social 
distance between the two communities. This dissociation also reflected on the social, economic, 
political and media practices of migrants from Turkey and the escalation of the Turkish-Kurdish 
conflict in Turkey had repercussions on the diaspora spaces (Altug 2006, Baser 2012). In the 
following pages, the reasons behind the activation of a diasporic identity among the Turkish 
community in Sweden are analysed with the aim of understanding the sudden interest in the 
promotion of homeland related politics. With the assumption that diasporic identities can remain 
active and dormant according to political and social circumstances as well as individual reasons 
and can be revived again under various circumstances, in Sweden two transformative and 
triggering factors can be observed: Kurdish diaspora activism and the passage of the Armenian 
Genocide Bill at the Swedish Parliament. The first factor is a more sustained one which 
galvanised interest in homeland politics gradually and the latter became the triggering event which 
catalysed activation and combined the scattered networks together. 
 
Kurdish Activism as a Transformative Factor 
Saideman et al. (2011: 14) suggest that “we should expect greater diaspora activism if there is 
significant political competition within the diaspora organization(s).” Diasporas make cost-benefit 
calculations and mobilise to ameliorate their perceived status within a given hostland. If there are 
                                                
12 Interview with the president of the Turkish association (STRF) and with the former president of the Turkish 
Youth Association (TUF), June 2010. 
pre-existing tensions between two diaspora groups imported from the homeland, it is possible that 
the two groups will monitor each other’s political movements in the host country to maintain the 
upper hand in discourses related to contested issues. Competition with other groups may indeed 
cause a behavioral shift and awaken interest and will to mobilise and affect policy-making 
mechanisms and the diaspora groups “stop seeing the issue of homeland as a low priority” (Kenny 
1998: 1).  
 
Certainly each member of the Turkish migrant community had a political stance, supported a 
political party/figure back in Turkey and had an individual interpretation of the state of affairs 
both in Sweden and Turkey. However, the proliferation of these political stances in a collective 
manner coincides with the ascending Kurdish activism in Sweden that started in the 1980s. Based 
on the participant observations as well as testimonies given in the interviews, it can be said that 
the Turkish community’s mobilisation developed to protect the “Turkish image” in the face of a 
(perceived) threat by other ethnically politicised groups in the host country. Mobilisation was 
gradual and born as a response to a specific situation in Sweden when the Turkish elite recognised 
that they were losing a discursive battle over the Kurdish issue. The second generation 
interviewee accounts in particular reveal that mobilisation for homeland related political issues 
only started being discussed in migrant organisations during the last decade. According to the 
majority of the interviewees, the reason they became interested in promoting homeland politics 
was that they gradually developed a reflexive nationalist discourse because “when Turks were 
silent, Kurds seized the opportunity to raise their voice.” Putting homeland politics on the agenda 
is strongly related to the Turkish community feeling neglected by the Swedish authorities and 
their need to intervene in a “worsening situation,” in the words of one interviewee. 
 
During the course of the interviews, the majority of Turkish respondents listed similar grievances: 
“the Swedish state is partial when it comes to the Kurdish question and supports the Kurds by all 
means”; “whatever the Turks have to say about the Kurdish question is badly received”; “Turks 
are disappointed by the Swedes’ behaviour and feel discriminated”; and “the Turks feel the need 
to be involved in politics at an organisational level only because the Swedish state takes sides in 
this conflict.” Their assertions regarding the existence of the “Kurdish lobby” and its alliance with 
other groups pushed them into a reactionary and politicised restructuring of their associations. 
Almost all of the participants had an openly negative stance towards the PKK and agreed that, 
although the PKK is on the terror list in EU countries, Sweden has a loosely tolerant policy 
towards it. Many others also mentioned that they feel frustrated in Sweden with regards to the 
Kurdish question, stating that they have no chance of “defending Turkey or themselves” because 
they are labelled as the “bad guys” by the Swedish authorities and Swedish society. They also 
stated that the Swedish authorities and media silenced their voices and they are not given 
sufficient opportunity to express themselves. 
 
Another fieldwork observation was that although the participants were economically and socially 
well integrated within Swedish society, they strove to be more active than their parents in terms of 
influencing the Swedish decision-making processes regarding Turkish political issues. This is not 
because they are more radical than their parents in terms of interpreting homeland politics but 
instead it is because they relate these issues to Swedish politics and their reactions are framed in 
the Swedish context rather than the Turkish one. To the second generation, Kurdish activism as 
well as the passage of the Genocide Bill is not interpreted as Turkish politics but it is a domestic 
issue that they need to deal with in Sweden. The second generation members act because these 
developments affect their lives in Sweden. The following testimony demonstrates that the 
homeland issues became a high priority for them not due to their interest in a policy change in 
Turkey but because of their concerns about their own status vis-à-vis the other ethnic minority 
groups in Sweden:  
 
Every day they were protesting in Sergels Torg13[…] When we passed by, we 
saw it[…] and we thought: what would the Swedes think about us, the Turks? 
We had to show them we were not as bad as the Kurds were trying to show us 
to be. 
 
Another testimony from a TUF member also shows that the Turkish community 
acted like a typical dormant state-linked diaspora until a political juncture in Sweden 
which galvanized an interest in counter-mobilisation:  
 
At first I thought we did not have to organise ourselves against the Kurds […] 
we are brothers. It is just a handful of extremists engaging in separatist 
propaganda. I told myself, we have our state, army, intelligence service, and 
embassy in Sweden […] it is not our job to respond to these Kurds. But after 
the Genocide Bill, I changed my mind. I realised that we are on our own and 
we will have to bear the consequences if we do not act. 
 
 
These reactions against Kurdish activism did not unite the Turkish community instantly but laid 
the foundation for an established diasporic structure. More and more Turkish members started 
writing blogs on a regular basis dealing with the issues related to Kurdish activism in Sweden and 
their support for “terrorist groups” in Turkey. Increasingly, one could see commentaries in 
numerous newspaper articles related to Turkey, condemning Sweden for “letting the Kurdish 
diaspora show open support for the PKK” which was considered as a “terrorist organisation.” The 
chat rooms of websites that publish articles about the political conundrum in Turkey became a 
venue for Turkish and Kurdish politically active youth to have virtual fights and provocations. For 
instance, one of the most famous blogs is called “The Anatolian Voice” which was founded by a 
second generation Turk with the motto of “a reaction to the incitement campaign against 
Turkey.”14 These individual attempts did not have a big impact on how Swedish policy makers 
perceived Turkish unease about what is going on in Sweden but they surely helped to show the 
Turkish community that these are not solely individual grievances but that there are many people 
out there who share similar views about the Kurdish diaspora activism. Diaspora nationalism 
started spreading within the Turkish community as a reactionary response to their perceived 
pecking order of ethnic groups in Sweden.  
 
Therefore, these reactions signal the initial motivations that raised interest in homeland politics. 
They began importing official homeland discourses to the hostland political sphere and 
strengthening ties with the Turkish state and its political actors. In 2007, various Turkish 
organisations lead by TRF and TUF organised a meeting, which was titled “No to Terror!” and 
there were more than a thousand people gathered in Stockholm to protest against the Kurdish 
organisation PKK and its actions in Turkey.15 With the responses to Kurdish activism the first 
sparks of the diaspora mobilisation process were born. These meetings gained continuous 
                                                
13 Sergels Torg is the central public square in Stockholm, Sweden, where many different groups organise protests.  
14 www.anatolianvoice.blogspot.co.uk 
15 “ Isvec ve Avusturya’da Terore Hayir Yuruyusu”, Milli Gazete, 29 October 2007. (Last accessed December 
2013). 
(http://www.milligazete.com.tr/haber/Isvec_ve_Avusturya39da_terore_hayir39_yuruyusu/59631#.UtVKchbbdU
Q).  
momentum and were repeated almost every year. Another “anti-PKK” meeting was organised in 
2011 by the main Turkish umbrella organisations.16 
 
The Armenian Genocide Bill as a Triggering Event 
 
The interviewee accounts indicate that the real push to mobilise was the Genocide Bill of 2010, 
which came as a shock to the Turkish community. They believe it stigmatised the Turkish 
community in Sweden and worried about its consequences. For example, the Turkish community 
raised concerns about the genocide-related issues being taught in schools in history classes and 
memorials in remembrance of the genocide being erected in Sweden. They found this to be an 
“unfair” representation of the Turkish community. Even though the members of the Turkish 
community had different opinions about the Armenian Genocide, the majority of the members 
united around one idea; “the decision of the parliament was discriminatory.” There are diaspora 
members who admit that the genocide occurred, but they disagreed with the Swedish Parliament’s 
role in condemning Turkey. There are others who deny the existence of Armenian Genocide and 
blame foreign powers for generating a “lie” to damage Turkey’s reputation. Finally, there are 
groups who think that both the Armenians and Turks committed crimes against each other and 
only historians can decide their fate. There are diverse perspectives about what happened in 1915, 
but what united and eventually mobilised the Turkish-Swedes were their common concerns 
regarding the consequences of this bill for their status in Sweden.  
 
The Genocide Bill also increased antagonism towards the Kurdish diaspora as the majority of the 
interviewees claimed that the bill was passed because the Kurdish diaspora lobbied for it. It is true 
that several Kurdish groups supported the passage of the bill by holding demonstrations before 
and after the process as well as by publishing declarations in favor of it. Moreover, several 
politicians from Kurdish backgrounds gave speeches in the Swedish Parliament regarding this 
issue. These acts were proof for the Turkish community that a “Kurdish lobby” had played a 
significant role. The Turkish association leaders and their members felt a sense of isolation 
throughout the entire process of passing the Genocide Bill. It was also apparent that diaspora 
nationalism was evolving rapidly, particularly among the Turkish youth. During the interviews, I 
asked why they perceived the Genocide Bill to be the ‘last straw’ considering that Kurdish 
activism had always existed in Sweden. Several interviewees argued that the Genocide Bill was 
the first time that the Swedish state had been openly involved in a contentious issue among 
supposedly antagonistic ethnic groups and showed its bias “officially.” Their answers revealed 
that the Turkish reaction was in response to a long-held complaint about Sweden’s attitude 
towards Turkish politics and was very much contextual.  
 
The initial reaction to the genocide resolution was an attempt to prevent it, later followed by 
protests and petitions. Before the vote in the parliament, some Turkish groups came together to 
form a small organisation called “Fakta forum Turkiet.”17 Their aim was to inform the Swedish 
public about Turkish history and politics, from their perspective, in order to “correct” current 
information about Turkey circulating the Swedish public and media. To support their claims they 
referenced the official Turkish discourse, which consisted of Turkish and foreign scholars’ works 
that deny the existence of genocide and several websites that belong to the Foreign Ministry of 
Turkey. The seminar organized by STRF with the participation of Prof. Justin McCarthy who 
argues that the atrocities of 1915 was not a genocide and who is frequently referred to in Turkish 
                                                
16  “Isvec’teki Turkler Teroru Protesto Etti”, Sabah, 28 August 2011. (Last accessed December 2013). 
(http://www.sabah.com.tr/Gundem/2011/08/28/isvecteki-turkler-teroru-protesto-etti).  
17“Fakta Forum Turkiet Toplanti Cagrisi”. (Last accessed 23 January 2013). 
http://www.tuf.nu/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1263&Itemid=99999999&lang=tr  
official discourses is an important example which shows that the diaspora discourse was being 
synchronised with the homeland’s official narrative of this highly sensitive issue. They issued a 
press release in February 2010 stating that the decision as to whether the 1915 events were an act 
of genocide should be the responsibility of historians – and not parliamentarians. They also noted 
that the Social Democrats’ decision would cause political division among migrant communities 
from Turkey.18 Additionally, some organisation members sent emails to the Social Democrat 
Party members, which included the reactions and concerns of the Turkish community in 
Sweden.19  
 
Shortly after the resolution was passed, the Swedish Turkish Workers Federation, the Swedish-
Turkish Federation, the Swedish Turkish Youth Federation, the Kemalist Thought Association 
and the Turkish Women’s Association organised a joint protest in Sergels Torg to condemn the 
parliament’s decision. It was one of the few occasions when Turkish associations gathered more 
than 3,000 people together for a protest. The Turkish association members carried banners 
accusing Sweden of “being unfair towards Turks” or “distorting historical facts for political 
reasons.” The Turkish elite who spoke at the protest highlighted the “unfairness” of the resolution 
for the Turkish community, the worsening relations between Armenia and Turkey, and the 
discriminatory consequences for the next generation. These protest events were mainly organised 
by the diaspora elites and not by the Turkish Embassy or any other official party. According to the 
leader of STRF, the embassy did not actively get involved in any stage of these events but they 
could feel its moral support. When asked about the importation of the official discourse in order to 
represent the Turkish discourse, he responded that these methods had been chosen not because the 
embassy projected it on them but because it was “practical.”  
 
The TUF published an article on the Turkish community’s concerns about the resolution itself and 
the monuments possibly being erected in recognition of the resolution where Turkish, Kurdish or 
Assyrian people live. Most of the people who were interviewed for the article were disturbed by 
the decision and said that the monuments would only increase tension between ethnic groups.20 
One of the leaders of the Turkish association said: 
 
They will raise monuments throughout Sweden, put this in the school books 
- our children will have to study it at school. Then they will come home and 
ask if our ancestors had committed such a crime. We don’t want this to 
happen. It is a problem for us, for young people and for our future children.  
 
Sökefeld (2006:275) argues that critical events in the home or host country are a necessary 
condition for diaspora mobilisation but they do not evoke diasporic consciousness all at once. As 
he states, “Events are only critical when they are perceived and framed in a particular way. Actors 
are needed to articulate that such events require new forms of action, discourse and ways of 
conceptualising the world.” It is usually the elites who initiate such actions, as is the case for the 
Turkish community in Sweden. Immediately following the passing of the Genocide Bill, the 
diaspora elite developed new strategies to accelerate the mobilisation process and to turn “all the 
spontaneous reactions into one collective action”, as one of the interviewees described. Many 
interviewees from different organisations highlighted their focus on the following aims: a) 
forming special lobby groups to support Turkish interests and to ameliorate the image of Turkey 
                                                
18 Yeni Birlik Magazines can be reached via this link: http://www.trf.nu/yenibirlik/  
19 Vizyon Magazine, Speech of the leader of the Turkish Association in Gothenburg.  
20“Sozde Soykirim Anitlari Yolda, Turkler Tepkili” 
http://www.tuf.nu/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1498&Itemid=1203 (Last accessed 23 January 
2013). 
in the eyes of the Swedish public and parliament, b) convincing young people (in particular) to 
learn about Turkish politics by organising seminars, inviting scholars from Turkey to speak, 
providing workshops on Turkey for Swedish politicians and scholars etc., c) maintaining close 
relations with the Swedish political parties and being actively involved in Swedish politics and, 
lastly, d) inviting Turkish authorities into the process and striving for greater cooperation between 
Turkey and Sweden to benefit the Turkish community in Sweden. As one association member 
stated: 
This all happened because we remained silent. We didn’t see what was 
coming. Now, all we need to do is to start from scratch. As the Turkish 
Youth in Sweden, we need to inform ourselves about Turkish politics in 
order to be able to respond to others when necessary. We will work on 
mobilising the young people first. 
 
Another one agreed: 
 
We cannot ignore the fact that the image of Turkey becomes our image here. 
We cannot just say I don’t care. Whatever happens in Turkey comes and 
finds us here in Sweden. 
 
The participants also commented on their engagement with Swedish political parties. For instance, 
almost all of them said they would never vote for the Leftist Party, as it is very partial in its 
support of the Kurdish community in Sweden. They were also reticent about the Social 
Democrats, which, for years, had the support of Turkish migrants. The interviewees said that after 
the Genocide Bill had been passed, the Social Democrats should “forget about Turkish votes” 
because this action had ignored the Turkish community in Sweden. Another participant from the 
TUF indicated that no party in Sweden “likes” Turkish people and as a Swedish citizen of Turkish 
origin, she feels underrepresented in Sweden. Because members of the Turkish community felt 
isolated by left-wing parties who voted in favor of the Bill, they sought an unofficial tacit alliance 
with the center-right Moderate Party, which criticised the bill and commented adversely on the 
passing of the Bill. Turkish associations organised petitions and campaigns to condemn the 
parliamentary decision but also to persuade the Turkish community to vote for the Moderate 
Party. Facebook and YouTube were utilised to encourage votes for the Moderate Party for the 
national elections that were held on 19th September 2010. Group emails were also sent to inform 
people about the voting process and about the importance of opposing the leftist block. Not only 
did the Turkish diaspora elite encourage an alliance with the Moderate Party in order to counter-
balance Kurdish diaspora activism and the support it receives from left wing parties, but also the 
Moderate Party began acknowledging the “Turkish Voice” and the Turkish diaspora as a 
monolithic body and started addressing them as such. For instance, for the 2010 elections, the 
Moderate Party prepared postcards that were sent to Turkish voters with the following messages: 
“Show your reaction to the leftist block which declared you as genocide perpetrators. Vote for the 
Moderate Party!” or “End this dirty game! Vote for the Moderate Party who supports the Turks” 
(Baser 2013:269). Even this changing attitude of a political party demonstrates that the perception 
of the Turkish community as an awakening diaspora was widening to the political circles in 
Sweden. As shown, the Genocide Bill remarks on the bourgeoning of diasporic activities as well 
as the changing perceptions and self-perceptions of the Turkish community in a Swedish context.  
 
Was it a one-off reaction?  
Almost four years since the Genocide Bill was passed, there have been significant developments 
in Turkish diasporic spaces related to homeland and hostland politics. First, clear signs of political 
mobilisation are evident: new websites, blogs, and Facebook pages exist encouraging Turks to 
unite in the transnational cyber space as well as actual protest events, seminars and parliamentary 
visits. New online newspapers have been established by second-generation diaspora members to 
draw attention to politics in Turkey. For example, TUF members established a website called 
gazete.se21 to inform Swedish society, as well as the Turkish community in Sweden, about 
controversial politics in Turkey. On their website, their stated aim is “to provide news in a 
balanced way and to pay attention to news and topics that may not be given adequate coverage in 
the traditional media.” Headlines have included “The Cyprus Question”, “The Kurdish Question”, 
“The Occupation of Azerbaijan”, and “What happened in Anatolia in 1915”, etc. The links have 
been prepared in a question-answer format, which coincides with the official Turkish discourse on 
these issues. Harbi Gazete, which is published by Turkish diaspora members in Sweden, added a 
separate section to its website under the title of “Genocide” where they regularly publish articles 
that are related to what they call “so-called Armenian Genocide” and how Sweden and other 
European countries approach this issue.22 Young Turks published articles on TRF’s website, 
calling for members of the Turkish community to “unite” and “surmount” the legacy of this 
event.23  
 
In addition to online social networking, Turkish migrant organisations, in collaboration with 
young Turkish activists, have organised several lobbying trips to Brussels and Turkey. In their 
opinion, Turkish membership to the EU is the key to solving the many problems that Turkey faces 
today. Therefore, a small committee consisting of 25 individuals organised a trip to the European 
Parliament in Brussels to lobby for Turkish membership to the EU.24 The diaspora newspapers 
and websites highlight the Turkish community’s efforts in Sweden to ameliorate the image of 
Turkey in Sweden and Europe.  
 
Conferences have been jointly organised by Azeri and Turkish associations in order to form a 
strategy of counter-mobilising against the antagonistic diaspora groups. On the anniversary of the 
Genocide Bill’s ratification, twelve Turkish associations, in collaboration with the Azeri, Uygur 
and Kazak associations in Sweden, organised a protest in Stockholm. The protestors laid a black 
wreath, as a sign of their discontent, and presented a letter to the Swedish parliament. The 
members of the associations not only complained about the worsening image of the Turks but they 
also referred to the image of Muslims.25 During the protests, the leader of TRF, the biggest 
Turkish umbrella organisation in Sweden stated the following: "It is difficult to fight with a 
Christian issue in a Christian country. This is how most Christian countries including Sweden 
perceive the Armenian issue".26 This brought a different dimension to the discussions around the 
status of Turks within the Swedish society. Their protest, as part of the diasporic narrative, 
combined their dissent about the worsening image of the Turkish community in Sweden with the 
generally worsening image of Muslims. Protesting on the anniversary of the passing of the Bill 
became an annual event for various Turkish organisations in Sweden and in 2013 there was a 
                                                
21 “Vad hände 1915?” http://gazete.se/index/index.php/Fragor-Svar/vad-haende-1915.html (Last accessed 23 
January 2013). 
22 Harbi Gazete, (last accessed 23 December 2013).  (http://www.harbigazete.com/haberler/soykirim/) 
23 “Sorunlarimizin Ustesinden Gelmenin Tek Yolu Birlik Olmak”, TRF website, (last accessed 13 January 
2014). (http://www.trf.nu/sorunlarimizin-ustesinden-gelmenin-tek-yolu-birlik-olmak.html) 
24“İsveçli Türkler Avrupa Parlamentosu’nda Türkiye’nin önemini anlattılar” 
http://www.tuf.nu/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1728&Itemid=1203 (last accessed 23 January 
2013). 
25 “İsveç Meclisi Siyah Çelenkle Protesto Edildi” http://www.trf.nu/isvec-meclisisiyah-celenkle-protesto-
edildi.html (last accessed 23 January 2013). 
26 “Turkish Diaspora Accuses Sweden of Double Standards.” (Last accessed 23 December 2013). 
(http://news.az/articles/11350) 
protest in front of Riksdag27, thus it seems like these reactionary mobilisations will take a 
sustained and systematic form in the coming years.  
 
Interactions with Turkey and Turkish Political Actors 
In the literature, there are numerous examples of homeland governments that are interested in 
creating a diaspora abroad as leverage in hostland policy-making processes. Therefore, 
diasporas are not simply a product of hostland elites but can be the result of homeland 
government efforts (Bauböck 2010: 316) and homeland political actors might expect diaspora 
groups to lobby host country governments for their “cause” (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003: 211). 
The literature on homeland-diaspora relations touched on the homeland’s involvement in 
diasporisation, however, there is still a huge gap regarding how the homeland decides to 
mobilise which diaspora group in a certain hostland. As Harutyunyan (2012: 7) suggested: “the 
diaspora-homeland relationship is often seen from the perspective of the so-called Solar 
System, where the diaspora is viewed as a periphery connected and belonging to one center, 
namely the homeland.” Yet the following questions remain: Which diaspora groups attract 
more attention from homeland actors? Does it relate to territorial proximity or bilateral 
relations between the homeland and the hostland? It is not within the scope of this paper to 
answer these questions. However, the case of the Turkish community in Sweden clearly shows 
that some diaspora groups attract more attention from homeland actors than others. For a very 
long time, the Turkish community in Sweden remained outside the scope of the Turkish state’s 
diaspora formation project. Compared to other countries, such as Germany or the Netherlands 
where many homeland political actors actively seek to build transnational networks, we see the 
Turkish migrants in Sweden suffering from the uneven distribution of attention of the Turkish 
policy makers (Baser 2013).  
 
The leading members of TUF and STRF mentioned that the consulate had a passive policy with 
the Turkish community that started with the first wave of migration to Sweden. They felt that 
Turkey abandoned them in Sweden and the embassy did not work to sustain a strong connection. 
Some members expected the first mobilisation initiatives to come from the embassy, while others 
argue that the organisations should take the lead. However, drawing from the interviewee 
accounts, it is clear that especially during the last decade, relations between the Turkish 
community and the Turkish Embassy improved. There were also several significant official visits 
from Turkey. The Prime Minister, Tayyip Erdoğan, visited Sweden in 2008 and held meetings 
with the leaders of Turkish associations. In his speech, Erdoğan emphasised the Swedish-Turks’ 
duty to be involved in Turkish politics because they had been granted voting rights in Turkey.28 
This kind of encouragement increased after the genocide resolution and continues today. The vast 
majority of the interviewees repeated their expectation of continued Turkish state support and 
contact with Turkish authorities regarding their lobbying activities. Organisations such as STRF 
and TUF also visited Ankara to strengthen relations and to offer suggestions about how to lobby 
in Sweden. The Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu and the Minister responsible for Turks 
abroad, Faruk Çelik, met with those groups to discuss how to better organise the Swedish-Turks in 
support of Turkey’s accession to EU membership and other political issues.29 When President 
Abdullah Gul visited Sweden, he made a speech addressing the Turkish migrants in Sweden. 
Referring to the Genocide Bill, he ordered the Turkish diaspora members to take a more active 
role in Sweden with regards to homeland-related politics: 
                                                
27 “Isvec Ucuncu Kez Protesto Edildi”, Harbi Gazete. (Last accessed 23 December 2013). 
(http://www.harbigazete.com/haber/795/isvec-3-kez-protesto-edildi.html) 
28“Stockholm’de 23 Nisan Kutlamasi” http://www.kuluhaber.net/haber_detay.asp?haberID=170 (Last accessed 23 
January 2013). 
29 Vizyon Magazine, page 24.  
 
“You should act like ambassadors of your motherland, Turkey, which you 
should represent here in the best way. You should protect and defend 
Turkey’s image, as there could be anti-Turkish propaganda. Turkey’s 
realities are much more different from such propaganda indeed.”30 
 
However, these initiatives have not yet met the expectations of the Turkish community. Newly 
achieved, closer cooperation does not mean that the Turkish state suddenly turned the immigrant 
organisations in Sweden into proxy actors in the hostland. Diasporisation projects by the 
homeland actors require further effort to achieve such a dramatic change. In reality, it will be 
difficult for the homeland political actors to diffuse into the already existing organisational 
structures. Therefore, the current mobilisation in Sweden is a call for collaboration from the 
diaspora elites to the homeland actors and it might lead to a reciprocal bonding between the 
homeland and the diaspora. It is important to note that the vast majority of diaspora elite members 
expressed their aim to build contingent alliances on certain issues, rather than taking direction 
from the Turkish Embassy or homeland actors. The leaders of both STRF and TRF emphasised 
seeking “partners not patrons”.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this paper was two-fold: to enhance our theoretical knowledge on how latent 
diasporas turn into active diasporas, while at the same time contributing to empirical knowledge 
on the Turkish political mobilisation in Sweden. It argued that diasporic awareness can be 
triggered by political developments in the host country, despite the issues possibly relating to 
homeland politics. The second-generation members of the transnational community can be 
affected by these developments, which could make them the forerunners of diasporic mobilisation. 
Especially at times, when their interests are at stake, they may align themselves with home state 
institutions or import discourses from home country policy makers. Their political actions do not 
always focus on policy change in their home country but they may use homeland related politics 
in the host country to influence host country politics.  
 
Diasporic awareness does not evolve overnight but is the result of the accumulation of grievances 
and common interests over time. This in combination with the elite members’ strategies can bring 
a community together for a collective aim. In the Sweden case, the reactions of the Swedish-
Turkish community were not against the Kurdish movement in Turkey per se, but to losing a 
discursive battle against the Kurdish diaspora in Sweden. In the same way Turkish reactions to the 
Genocide Bill were not against the Armenian claims per se but mostly against the loss of prestige 
in the eyes of Swedish society. What concerned the Turkish first and second generations more was 
the consequences of this bill for their community and what it indicated about their status in 
comparison to other ethnic communities in Sweden. The passing of the Genocide Bill had a more 
enduring impact on the Turkish community because the Turkish community felt targeted and 
stigmatised by the parliament’s decision. It marked community members seeing the issue of 
homeland politics as high priority for the first time. Consequently, it strengthened the Turkish 
community’s pre-existing connection with Turkey. The Turkish community in Sweden presents 
several noticeable trends in displaying diasporic behavior, such as having stronger ties with the 
Turkish Embassy and other political actors, forming lobbying strategies, and elite members’ 
efforts to mobilise young people within the Turkish community. Diaspora nationalism is on the 
                                                
30 Presidency of the Republic of Turkey Official Webpage. (Last accessed December 2013). 
(http://www.tccb.gov.tr/news/397/85377/gul-pays-the-first-state-visit-from-turkey-to-sweden.html).  
rise and it is the second generation who are taking the lead in converting a Turkish transnational 
migrant community into an active Turkish diaspora.  
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